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Abstract
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) augment existing models of expected accruals to incorporate conditional
conservatism. They document a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses
and gains, and demonstrate that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have increased
explanatory power. This discussion of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) makes five main points: 1)
incorporating asymmetry in gain and loss recognition is an important contribution to empirical models of
expected accruals; 2) the economic underpinnings of asymmetry in loss and gain recognition remain
open to considerable debate; 3) the extent to which accruals recognize gains in a timely manner remains
an interesting but unanswered question; 4) non-working capital accruals are important to both the
earnings process and accounting conservatism, yet modeling of nonworking capital accruals has
received little attention in the literature; and 5) incorporating asymmetry into the accruals process has
important implications for estimating discretionary accruals and for future research in this area.
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Abstract
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) augment existing models of expected accruals to incorporate
conditional conservatism. They document a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals
and economic losses and gains, and demonstrate that accruals models that incorporate this
asymmetry have increased explanatory power.
This discussion of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) makes five main points: 1) incorporating
asymmetry in gain and loss recognition is an important contribution to empirical models of
expected accruals; 2) the economic underpinnings of asymmetry in loss and gain recognition
remain open to considerable debate; 3) the extent to which accruals recognize gains in a timely
manner remains an interesting but unanswered question; 4) non-working capital accruals are
important to both the earnings process and accounting conservatism, yet modeling of nonworking capital accruals has received little attention in the literature; and 5) incorporating
asymmetry into the accruals process has important implications for estimating discretionary
accruals and for future research in this area.

December 14, 2005

1

I appreciate helpful comments from Philip Berger and John Core, and acknowledge the support of The Wharton
School.

1

1. Introduction
The accrual process is central to financial accounting. Accruals adjust cash flows to
reported earnings and form the building blocks for the balance sheet. Given the importance of
accruals to financial accounting, it is surprising how sparse the modeling of the overall accrual
process has been within the literature. Until recently, the “state of the art” empirical approach
modeled total accruals as a function of the change in sales and PP&E (Jones, 1991). Recently,
working capital accruals have been more formally modeled as a function of firms’ selling
activity and past, present, and future operating cash flows (e.g., Dechow, Kothari and Watts,
1998; Dechow and Dichev, 2002).
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) incorporate conditional conservatism, an important feature
of the earnings process, into existing accruals models. Specifically, they recognize that accruals
are expected to be an asymmetric function of firm performance in which economic losses are
captured by the accruals process in a more timely manner than gains. Their evidence documents
a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses and gains, and
demonstrates that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have increased explanatory
power. The authors’ innovation advances research on modeling the accruals process and is sure
to play an important role in accounting research on both nondiscretionary and discretionary
components of accruals.
This discussion begins in Section 2 by reviewing existing models of expected accruals.
Section 3 illustrates the role of accruals in recognizing gains and losses and argues that the extent
to which accruals recognize gains in a timely manner remains an interesting but unanswered
question. In Section 4, I discuss the authors’ main tests and contributions to our understanding of
the asymmetric recognition of losses and gains. I also argue that the economic underpinnings of
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asymmetry in loss and gain recognition remain open to considerable debate. Section 5 briefly
ties the authors' work into extant research on estimating discretionary accruals and provides
avenues for future research. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

2. Models of expected accruals
The accruals model developed by Jones (1991), one of three models examined by Ball
and Shivakumar, is an early attempt to empirically describe the accrual process. Somewhat
surprisingly, this early model is still widely used by researchers to estimate expected accruals
and deviations from expected accruals. The Jones model relies on the fundamental notions that
working capital accruals, such as receivables and inventory, are expected to increase with sales,
and that long-term accruals, such as depreciation, are expected to increase with investments in
plant, property and equipment. Because growth in receivables and inventory increases earnings
relative to operating cash flows, and depreciation expense decreases earnings relative to cash
flows, α1 is predicted to be positive, and α2 is predicted to be negative in the following
specification:

Jones model: ACCt =α0 + α1∆REVt + α2GPPEt +εt

(1)

where ACC is total accruals (i.e., earnings minus operating cash flows), ∆REV is the one-period
change in revenues, and GPPE is the gross value of plant, property, and equipment.
The other two models examined by Ball and Shivakumar, one relying on work by
Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (DKW, 1998) and the other developed by Dechow and Dichev (DD,
2002), are based on the fundamental idea that working capital accruals improve the
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informativeness of earnings by smoothing out transitory fluctuations in working capital cash
flows, such as inventory and accounts receivable. For example, consider a buildup in inventory
in the previous period that is sold on account in the current period and subsequently collected in
cash the next period. Consequently, operating cash flow is negative last period, zero in the
current period when the earnings process is actually completed, and positive next period. Such
transitory fluctuations make operating cash flows a less informative measure of firm
performance than earnings (e.g., see Dechow, 1994). Ball and Shivakumar refer to this as the
“noise reduction” role of accruals. Thus, these models emphasize the relation between accruals
and past, current, and future operating cash flows as follows:

Cash flow (CF) model:

ACCt =α0 + α1CFt +εt

Dechow-Dichev (DD) model: ACCt = α0 + α1 CFt + α2 CFt-1 + α3 CFt+1 + εt

(2)
(3)

where ACC is total accruals, and CFt-1, CFt, and CFt+1 are one-period lagged, current, and oneperiod future operating cash flows, respectively. Note that although DKW and DD explicitly
model only working capital accruals, Ball and Shivakumar (and DKW) empirically examine total
accruals as the dependent variable in Eqs. (2) and (3). I return to this issue below.
All three models, Jones, CF, and DD, rely on a similar idea: accruals are expected to be a
function of firms’ real business activity, where real business activity is predominantly captured
by increases or decreases in firm sales. The Jones model includes the change in sales directly in
the model. The CF and DD models are both derived from the accruals process framework
developed by DKW. DKW begin with a model that relates sales to accruals and derive
contemporaneous and lead-lag relations between accruals and operating cash flow under the
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explicit assumption that accruals resolve timing and matching problems. DD extends DKW by
recognizing that current period accruals that are not a function of prior period and future period
cash flows may be of lower quality. The CF model is a special case of the DD model in that it
uses only current period cash flow as a workhorse to capture business activity and therefore
assumes that all accruals have the same relation with business activity.
As described in detail below, Ball and Shivakumar’s main tests of conditional
conservatism consist of adjustments to Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) using total accruals (i.e., including
both short-term and long-term accruals) as the dependent variable. Of the three accruals models
described above, only the Jones model attempts to explain variation in short- and long-term
accruals. The Jones model explicitly models long-term accruals from depreciable assets,
although it excludes other non-working capital accruals such as deferred taxes and restructuring
charges. DKW and DD acknowledge that long-term accruals are associated with cash flows, and
also potentially resolve timing and matching problems. Guay and Sidhu (2001) document
empirically that long-term accruals in general, as well as individual components of long-term
accruals such as depreciation and deferred tax, resolve timing and matching problems in cash
flows in much the same way as short-term accruals. Further, they show that the cross-sectional
variance of aggregate long-term accruals as well as individual components of long-term accruals
are large, suggesting that an accruals model designed only to explain working capital accruals is
likely to explain total accruals with substantial error. DKW and DD note that modeling longterm accruals is more difficult than working capital accruals because the relation between longterm accruals and cash flows occurs over a longer and more variable time period. Thus, the CF
and DD accruals models in Eqs. (2) and (3) above have no explicit modeling of long-term
accruals.
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It is useful to consider how well working capital accrual models are expected to perform
in tests by Ball and Shivakumar, DKW, and many other empirical papers that examine total
accruals, inclusive of both working capital and long-term accruals. Ball and Shivakumar provide
some insight into this question in additional detail contained in the conference version of the
paper that has been dropped in the published version. Specifically, they examine the explanatory
power of the DD model when individual components of accruals are used as the dependent
variable in the accruals regressions. The coefficients on the explanatory variables in the DD
model are quite similar across regressions where individual working capital accruals (e.g.,
accounts receivable and inventory) are the dependent variables. However, when individual
components of long-term accruals (e.g., depreciation) are the dependent variables, the
coefficients are very different from those of regressions with short-term accruals as the
dependent variables. This suggests that constraining all short-term accruals to have the same
relation with the explanatory variables may not be a problem, but that constraining the
coefficients across short-term and long-term accruals is likely to reduce the explanatory power of
the models. Further, some of the more interesting accruals associated with asymmetry and
conservatism, such as restructuring charges, goodwill impairments, and asset write-downs, are
long-term accruals. The modeling of long-term accruals appears to be a topic for future research.

3. Gains and loss recognition role of accruals
Ball and Shivakumar argue that the accruals models described above can be improved by
recognizing that in addition to resolving timing and matching problems in working capital cash
flows, accruals also serve to recognize economic gains and losses in a timely manner. They refer
to gains and losses as shocks to current period cash flows plus revisions in the expectation of
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firms’ future cash flows. The authors provide intuitive examples of gains and losses in short-term
accruals such as changes in the value of trading securities, inventory write-downs, and
receivables revaluations. They also provide examples of gains and losses in long term accruals,
such as restructuring charges, goodwill impairment charges, and asset impairment charges.
Considerable empirical evidence documents that the timely recognition of gain and loss
accruals yields an earnings measure that improves upon cash flows as a measure of firm
performance (e.g., Dechow, 1994; DKW, 1998). Watts (2003) makes the often overlooked point
that the timely recognition of both gain and loss accruals increases the efficiency of the earnings
measure for debt and compensation contracting:
Agency cost-reducing contracts include debt contracts between the firm and holders of
the firm's debt, management compensation contracts, employment contracts, and costplus sales contracts. Contracting parties demand timely measures of performance and net
asset values for compensation and debt contract purposes. Ceteris paribus, managerial
performance measures in compensation contracts, such as earnings, are more effective
when they are timely and reflect the effects of the managers' actions on firm value in the
period in which the actions are taken. Timeliness avoids dysfunctional outcomes
associated with managers' limited tenure with the firm, often referred to as the manager's
limited horizon. For example, a manager may forgo positive net present value projects
with near-term negative earnings because future earnings will reflect the benefits of the
project after the manager has retired or left the firm (Watts, 2003a, pg. 211).
Many researchers emphasize the importance of timely recognition of losses in writing efficient
debt, compensation, and other contracts over accounting earnings. However, timely recognition
of gains should also generally result in more efficient contracts written over earnings. This point
should not be surprising. The exclusion of timely gain accruals makes earnings a less informative
measure of firm performance, and it is difficult to construct a contracting setting where less
informative earnings make the contract more efficient. Thus, contracts written over earnings are
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expected to be more efficient when both loss and gain accruals are recognized in a timely manner
(subject to cost considerations as described in Section 4).2
Ball and Shivakumar identify four proxies for economic gains and losses: (1) current
period cash flows, (2) change in cash flows, (3) industry-adjusted cash flows, and (4) marketadjusted stock returns. They include these proxies as additional explanatory variables in Eqs. (1),
(2) and (3) above. As described in Section 4, they also allow the coefficients on economic gains
and losses to differ for gains as compared to losses. For example, in Eq. (1), when the change in
cash flows is used as the proxy for economic gains and losses, the authors’ regression is
estimated as follows:

ACCt =α0 + α1∆REVt + α2GPPEt + α3∆CFt + α4D∆CFt + α5D∆CF*∆CFt +εt

(4)

where ∆CFt is the change in operating cash flow from period t-1 to t, and D∆CFt is a dummy
variable equal to one when ∆CFt is negative, and zero otherwise.
Before turning to the authors’ main tests, which relate to predictions and inferences about
the incremental timeliness of accruals in reflecting losses (i.e., α5), I discuss the frequently
overlooked timeliness of gains. The authors do not explore the question of whether accruals
recognize gains in a timely manner. Specifically, they make no predictions or inferences about
the coefficient on the proxy for economic gains and losses that they estimate in their accruals
regressions (e.g., α3 in Eq. (4) above).
The reason the authors do not draw inferences about the timeliness of gains appears to be
two-fold. First, they note that the inference from their cash-flow-based proxies for economic
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See Guay and Verrecchia (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the role of timely recognition of both gains and
losses in earnings.
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gains and losses is complicated by the correlation between these proxies and some of the
independent variables in the accruals models. For example, there is a clear correlation between
the cash-flow-based proxies for economic gains and losses and the lagged, current and future
cash flows that DD include to capture the quality with which working capital accruals resolve
matching problems. The authors’ concern about the influence of these correlations appears valid.
Although the coefficient on economic gains and losses, α3 in Eq. (4) above, is expected to be
positive (i.e., accruals should increase with gains and decrease with losses), the authors find a
significant negative coefficient in their Table 3, Panel B. This finding suggests that the
coefficient on Ball and Shivakumar’s proxy for economic gains and losses in this specification is
dominated by the smoothing function of working capital accruals modeled by DKW, that is, by
the negative predicted relation between cash flows and working capital accruals.
The second reason that the authors do not explore whether accruals reflect both timely
gains and losses appears to be something of a lack of interest within the literature. As noted
above, subject to cost considerations, timely recognition of both losses and gains is a desirable
property of earnings and accruals that is expected to improve the efficiency of contracts.
Although Ball and Shivakumar briefly list explanations for why financial reporting might exhibit
timelier recognition of losses than gains, there is no apparent reason to believe that contracts
demand only losses to be timely (in Section 4 below, I expand on this issue). However, while the
timeliness of losses has been the focus of much recent study, the timeliness of gains has been
largely ignored. As a result, our understanding of the timeliness of gains is lacking, and the
general question of whether and when accruals recognize gains in a timely manner is left
unanswered for future research.
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4. Asymmetric recognition of gains and losses in accruals
Ball and Shivakumar’s main hypothesis is that accruals exhibit conditional conservatism
in recognizing gains and losses, that is, accruals exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses
than gains. Their tests explore whether accruals models that explicitly consider this asymmetry
have greater explanatory power than models that do not.
Although a large volume of empirical literature beginning with Basu (1997) documents
that accounting earnings do exhibit asymmetry with respect to gains and losses, there is
considerable debate over the economic determinants of this asymmetry.3 One interpretation of
the literature is that the demand for asymmetrically timely earnings can be explained by the
following two part contracting-related hypothesis: 1) accrual accounting is a costly activity, and
2) contracting parties have a greater demand for timely loss recognition than timely gain
recognition.
Both parts of the hypothesis are critically important. First, accrual accounting must be
non-trivially costly. As noted above, earnings that incorporate only timely losses are less
informationally efficient than earnings that incorporate both timely losses and gains. Therefore,
if accrual accounting is not very costly, earnings that incorporate both timely losses and gains are
expected to be preferred for contracting (as well as being preferred for valuation and other uses
of accounting earnings).
Is accrual accounting actually costly? Although detailed discussion of the direct or
indirect costs of accrual accounting is somewhat sparse in the conservatism literature, it certainly
seems likely that the costs are non-trivial. Constructing expectations and changes in expectations
about future cash flows related to assets and liabilities can be time-consuming and both capital
3

For excellent summaries of the theory and empirical work on conservative accounting, see Ball (2001) and Watts
(2003a and 2003b). Also, see Guay and Verrecchia (2005) for a more detailed discussion of related points on the
demands for symmetric and asymmetric recognition of gains and losses in contracting.
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and labor intensive. Further, as noted by Watts (2003a), verifying such expectations can be
costly, and there may also be greater litigation costs associated with forecasts of future cash
flows that subsequently turn out to be incorrect.
The second part of the hypothesis is that the contracting-based demand for timely gains
and losses is not symmetric. Note that the issue here is not whether shareholders, debtholders and
managers would prefer to contract over earnings that incorporate only timely losses – it has
already been noted above that they would generally prefer to contract over informationally
efficient earnings that incorporate both timely losses and gains. Instead the issue is whether and
why the benefits derived from information about losses are greater than the benefits derived from
information about gains. Debt and compensation contracts are widely used in the literature to
motivate the demand for asymmetric timeliness of gains and losses, and so I focus my discussion
on these two settings.
Watts (2003a) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) argue that timely gain recognition is in
less demand than timely loss recognition because managers will voluntarily disclose information
about gains. However, because the financial accounting system explicitly excludes the timely
recognition of many economic gains, it is not clear how such voluntary disclosures about gains
are verified at low cost outside the accounting system. It is difficult to write contracts over
voluntarily disclosed information. Therefore, it is not clear how debt and compensation contracts
will be more efficient when they are written over a combination of audited financial earnings that
incorporate timely losses and nonaudited voluntary disclosures about gains.
However, the arguments in the literature about voluntary disclosure of gains may not be
critical to constructing an argument for why debt contracting would demand relatively more
timely information about losses than gains. Debtholders’ financial claims are more sensitive to
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bad news about profitability or the value of net assets than they are to good news. For example,
holders of debt in a financially healthy firm are more likely to find significant bad news relevant
to valuing their claims, and are less likely to find good news important in valuing their claims.
As a result, if both timely gains and losses are costly to incorporate into earnings, debt
contracting will create a demand for relatively more of the timely loss accruals (and contracting
parties will be willing to wait until difficult-to-verify gains are realized, at which point they
become easier to verify and are incorporated into earnings).
The demand in executive compensations contracts for asymmetric recognition of gains
and losses is less obvious. Because accrual accounting and cash accounting result in the same
total earnings over time (subject to clean surplus and other standard assumptions), preferences
over accounting systems for compensation contracting are related to managerial horizon issues.
A large literature documents the existence of both underinvestment and overinvestment by
managers with short horizons. For example, as Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) note, if losses are
not recognized in a timely manner in earnings, managers with short horizons may not
discontinue poorly performing projects. There is a flip side however, as recognized in the quote
by Watts (2003a) cited above. If gains are not recognized in a timely manner, managers with
short horizons may forgo investing in positive NPV projects.4 Therefore, if we make the
assumption that it is efficient to write compensation contracts over accounting earnings (as
opposed to contracting over stock returns or other performance measures), it is not clear why or
4

As an example of a setting where timely gain and loss information might be important, consider a recent study by
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005), who examine in a global setting the speed with which managers increase or
decrease investment flows in response to improved or deteriorating investment opportunities, respectively. The
focus of the authors’ analysis is whether managers decrease investment flows in response to deteriorating investment
opportunities more quickly when accounting information about losses is more timely. However, the authors’
descriptive statistics indicate that the speed with which managers increase investment flows in response to improved
investment opportunities varies as much across countries as the speed with which managers decrease investment
flows in response to deteriorating investment opportunities. This comparison suggests that providing incentives for
managers to take positive NPV projects may well be equally as important as providing managers with incentives to
shut down negative NPV problems.
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how a compensation contract would be more efficient by excluding timely information about
economic gains.
It is also important to note that as long as the second part of the contracting-based
hypothesis is valid (i.e., the existence of an asymmetric demand for gain and loss accruals), it is
not necessary that gain and loss accruals have asymmetric costs. In other words, since net
benefits equal gross benefits less costs, the net benefits of recognizing losses can be greater than
that of gains even when the costs are the same. This is helpful because it is not always clear how
much more costly gains are to verify and incorporate into earnings than losses. For example, the
accounting rules dictating impairments of tangible and intangible assets require managers to
estimate future cash flows that will be generated by the assets. Those estimates may yield lower
or higher values for the assets, and it is unclear why verifying one outcome is more costly than
the other. As another example, the lower-of-cost-or-market rule for inventories requires
managers to make income-decreasing accruals when estimates of the value of inventory suggest
a decline in value, but not an increase in value. It is not clear why estimates of increases in
inventory value are more costly to verify than decreases in inventory value.
Regardless of the reasons behind asymmetry of gains and losses in earnings, it is
empirically well-documented that earnings are indeed asymmetric in the recognition of gains and
losses. Therefore, it is important to incorporate this empirical regularity into accruals models. To
test the prediction that accruals models have greater explanatory power when this asymmetry is
considered, Ball and Shivakumar construct a piecewise linear regression that allows the
coefficient on proxies for economic gains and losses to vary across positive and negative values,
as in Eq. (4) above. The incremental coefficient on losses, α5 in Eq. (4), is predicted to be
positive. Across all three accruals models (Jones, CF, and DD), and for all proxies for economic
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gains and losses, accruals are shown to recognize economic losses in a more timely manner than
gains. Further, the authors show that this result is robust to many empirical specifications.
Is the asymmetric recognition of economic gains and losses in accruals best modeled with
a piecewise linear specification with a single ‘kink’? It is difficult to say. Certainly, one could
argue that multiple kinks could improve the specification because some accruals are explicitly
designed to be a nonlinear function of gains and losses. For example, consider the two-part rules
for long-lived asset impairments. First, firms must determine whether the undiscounted expected
cash flows from the asset are less than the net book value of the asset. Conditional on this being
the case, the asset impairment is based on the difference between the net book value of the asset
and the discounted expected cash flows from the asset. If the undiscounted expected cash flows
are greater than the net book value, no impairment is recognized. Thus, the impairment rules are
designed to ignore small economic losses on long-lived assets (e.g., where expected cash flows
decline, but not by too much), but to fully recognize the decline in value for large economic
losses. It remains to be seen whether more complex piecewise linear or non-linear specifications
of accruals will improve upon the Ball and Shivakumar specification. However, any such
improvements to this model should be grounded in a well-specified theory of the appropriate
functional form.
In summary, the Ball and Shivakumar findings are important and should be noncontroversial given existing literature on the asymmetry with which earnings recognize positive
and negative news. Future research that models the accrual process will be better specified by
incorporating this asymmetry.

5. Unexpected accruals and discretionary accruals
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Within the accounting literature, the most commonly examined aspect of accrual
expectation models is the residuals, or unexpected accruals. Numerous papers use estimates of
unexpected accruals as proxies for accruals quality or the discretionary use of accruals. It is wellknown that the residuals from these models estimate discretionary accruals with considerable
error (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996). There are two
general types of error: 1) the residuals can contain nondiscretionary accruals, and 2) the
estimates of nondiscretionary accruals (i.e., the predicted or fitted values from the models) can
contain discretionary accruals. What are the implications of these errors and how does the Ball
and Shivakumar approach help mitigate these problems?
First, let us consider the case where the residuals from accruals models contain
nondiscretionary accruals. This is likely to be the case when firms experience performancedriven shocks to earnings that cause accruals to deviate from their normal relation with the
independent variables in the accruals model. For example, the Jones model assumes that the
accrual component of earnings is a constant proportion of changes in sales and PP&E. When a
firm builds up inventory in anticipation of future growth in sales, the Jones model considers this
inventory activity to be a discretionary accrual. At best, this specification problem will cause
measurement error that makes it difficult for researchers to document predicted relations between
discretionary accruals and economic variables of interest. More problematic however, is the fact
that the error in discretionary accruals is often correlated with firm performance, and in many
settings, the researcher examines a stimulus for earnings management that is also correlated with
firm performance. For example, consider the researcher who examines whether firms attempt to
inflate stock price by managing earnings upward prior to accessing the capital markets. Firms
raising capital generally have experienced positive growth and performance, and these firms will
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likely be found to have positive discretionary accruals simply because the Jones model fails to
capture these shocks (regardless of whether there exists true earnings management caused by
capital raising activities). In these cases, the researcher’s tests will be biased toward finding
earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).
Ball and Shivakumar’s approach recognizes that accruals in the presence of poor
performance are expected to be asymmetric relative to accruals in the presence of good
performance. As a result, their adjustment to the accruals models may aid researchers in
mitigating performance-induced measurement error. To provide evidence on this point, it would
be interesting to identify specific settings or samples of firms where the Ball and Shivakumar
approach alters inferences about discretionary accrual behavior vis-à-vis inferences from existing
accruals models.
A related development in the quest to purge performance-driven measurement error in
discretionary accruals is put forward by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (KLW, 2005). KLW
suggest a matched-sample approach, which can be useful when the variable of interest is not
well-modeled and the functional form between the variable of interest and the explanatory
variables is not well understood. KLW choose return on assets as their matching variable under
the assumption that a key component of the measurement error in discretionary accruals is the
presence of nondiscretionary accruals that are correlated with firm performance. The benefit of
such an approach is that discretionary accruals should be purged of a strong correlation with firm
performance. The cost however is that the researcher must compute performance-matched
discretionary accruals as the difference between two estimates of discretionary accruals (the
treatment firm and the control firm) that are both measured with substantial error. Therefore,
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although the resulting discretionary accrual measure is expected to be less biased with respect to
firm performance, it is also expected to contain greater noise.
It is possible that the Ball and Shivakumar approach and the KLW approach accomplish
similar things. The former recognizes that the accruals process is correlated with firm
performance as measured by proxies for economic losses, while the latter recognizes that the
accruals process is correlated with firm performance as measured by return on assets. Ball and
Shivakumar recognize that the accruals process is asymmetric in firm performance. Likewise,
KLW’s matched-sample approach implicitly allows for an asymmetric relation between accruals
and firm performance. In fact, the KLW approach allows for not only asymmetry, but also for
the possibility that the relation between accruals and firm performance is a more complicated
functional form. Indeed, one of the motivations behind the KLW approach is that accruals
models misclassify nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary for firms with extreme earnings
performance. It would be interesting to know whether the Ball and Shivakumar and KLW
approaches are each incrementally helpful in estimating discretionary accruals.
The second measurement error problem with discretionary accruals models is that
estimates of non-discretionary accruals may contain discretionary accruals. As noted in KLW, if
the motivation for discretionary accruals is related to the explanatory variables in the accruals
models, the models will misclassify some discretionary accruals as nondiscretionary. For
example, the Jones model includes change in sales as a proxy for growth-driven working capital
accruals. Therefore, if firms that experience a decline in sales attempt to meet earnings targets
via positive discretionary accruals, the residuals from the Jones model will not capture all of the
discretionary accruals. This implies that if the question the researcher wants to answer is, “What
is the magnitude of discretionary accruals being used by a given set of firms,” models that
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control for firm performance will understate true discretionary accruals. On the other hand, if the
motivation for discretionary accruals is not recent firm performance (or at least is not highly
correlated with firm performance), such as discretionary accruals around grants of executive
stock options, the residuals from the accruals should contain a substantial fraction of the
discretionary accruals. Neither the Ball and Shivakumar approach nor the DLW approach
appears to resolve this second measurement error problem.

6. Conclusion
Understanding the accrual process and developing good models that accurately capture
the behavior of accruals is a key issue in a broad range of accounting research. Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) incorporate conditional conservatism, the asymmetric timeliness with which
accruals recognize economic losses, into the existing accruals models. The authors’ findings are
important and consistent with existing literature on the asymmetry with which earnings
recognize positive and negative news, and should result in better specified models of the accrual
process.
At the same time, the authors’ analysis highlights several issues for future research. First,
the modeling of when and to what extent accruals recognize economic gains is left as an
unanswered question. The timely recognition of economic gains is expected to improve
contracting efficiency, and even though loss recognition is more timely than gain recognition, it
would be helpful to know more about the timeliness of gains and how it should be modeled. Ball
and Shivakumar are not able to interpret their regression coefficients on economic gains due to
econometric issues, and so leave this question for future research. Second, the modeling of
working capital accruals has received the most attention in the literature and as a result working
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capital accruals are better understood than long-term accruals. More accurate models of longterm accruals will likely improve the overall modeling of the accrual process. Finally, Ball and
Shivakumar’s results suggest improvements that can be made to models of the discretionary
accrual component of earnings. Recent work by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) argues that
performance-matched discretionary accruals measures are necessary because accruals
expectations models do not adequately control for the relation between accruals and firm
performance. As models of expected accruals become more complete (e.g., by incorporating
asymmetries in the recognition of economic gains and losses), performance matching may be
less necessary or may require a performance-matching variable that is different from the return
on assets measure advocated by Kothari et al. (2005).
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